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FREE EXERCISE IS DEAD, LONG LIVE FREE EXERCISE:
SMITI, LUKUMIAND THE GENERAL APPLICABILITY
REQUIREMENT
Richard F. Duncan*
"Free exercise-let us as Americans assert it-is an American invention.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause is the Mark Twain of Constitutional
Law, because the recent report of its death "was an exaggeration."2
According to the conventional wisdom in the community of First
Amendment scholars, in Employment Division v. Smith3 the Supreme
Court "abandoned"4 its longstanding commitment to protecting the
free exercise of religion and "created a legal framework for persecu-
tion"5 of religious dissenters. It is certainly true that under Smith the
general rule seems to be that government may prohibit what religion
requires or require what religion prohibits. In other words, when
the Court translates the constitutional command that government
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On June 1, 1897, Mark Twain wrote to the London correspondent of the Ner York Journal,
"The report of my death was an exaggeration." BARTLEtT's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 528 (1 6'h ed.
.1992).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Atmonnalities, 75 IND. L.J.
77, 78 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CIII.
L. REv. 1109,1110 (1990).
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4. Professor Laycock
does not subscribe to the conventional reading of Smith; rather, he was merely noting that if the
conventional wisdom about the Smith decision is correct, religious persecutions will be the re-
sult. Id. Laycock further observed that his use of the strong word, "persecution," was carefully
chosen and meant "quite literally." Id.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82.
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"shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion,7 the
First Freedom' becomes a license for government to "proscribe[] (or
prescribe[]) conduct that... religion prescribes (or proscribes)."
Although the general rule of Smith thus permits government to
prohibit the free exercise of religion, the Court has recognized a
number of exceptions that continue to protect religious dissenters
under a compelling interest test. Most significantly, Smith applies
only when government incidentally burdens religiously motivated
behavior by means of "a 'valid and neutral law of general applicabil-
ity.' "0 As the Court subsequently emphasized in Church of the Luimi
Babalu Aye v. Hialeah," "a law burdening religious practice that is not
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous
of scruiny."1 2 Thus, the key to understanding the Constitution's pro-
tection of religious liberty in the post-Sinith world is to locate the
boundary line between neutral laws of general applicability and those
that fall short of this standard.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and theorize about the
general applicability standard and its impact on the free exercise of
religion. At the end of the day, I will argue that free exercise is alive
and well in the wake of Smith and (particularly) Luhumi.
II. FREE EXERCISE AT THE MILLENNIUM: SMITH AND LUIWmI
A. The Doctrine And Reasoning of Smith
In 1990, the Supreme Court cast aside almost three decades of
free exercise jurisprudence when it handed down its decision in
Smith. The free exercise doctrine abolished in Smith was, at least in
theory, "highly protective of religious liberty."" Under this well-
settled body of law, a governmental restriction that substantially bur-
dened religiously motivated behavior was valid only if the government
justified it by demonstrating that it was the least restrictive means of
U.S. CONST. amend 1.
Religious liberty is the "first freedom" protected by the Bill of Rights. &, uL Religious
liberty is foundational, because it is "based on the view that the relations betven God and Man
are outside the authority of the state." Michael W. McConnell. Rrfigus Frerdaoi at a Crowswds.
59 U. CHI. L REV. 115, 173 (1992). As Madison observed, free exercise of religion is also "irst"
because the duty to please and obey God "is precedent both in order of time and degree of ob-
ligation to the claims of Civil Society." JAMES LDISON, M2E-MORn. AND REtOo.STr.KN.
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS.ENTS (1785), renprintcd in Everson v. Board of Education. 330 US. I.
64 (1947).
g Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
'0 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252. 262 n.3 (1982) (StephensJ.. con-
curring).
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
" Id. at 546.
McConnell, supra note 4, at 1110.
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achieving a compelling state interest. 4 This so-called "conduct ex-
emption"''5 dates back to 1963 and the Court's landmark decision in
Sherbert v. Verner,6 in which the Court held that South Carolina could
not withhold unemployment compensation benefits from a woman
who had refused work for religious reasons. 7 However, as Professor
McConnell has bluntly stated, the Court's pre-Smith free exercise doc-
trine "was more talk than substance."'8 In practice, the Court "only
rarely sided With the free exercise claimant," 9 and explained these re-
sults sometimes by denying that the governmental scheme consti-
tuted a "burden" on religious liberty, ° sometimes by concluding that
the governmental interest was "compelling" and thus justified a tak-
ing of religious liberty,2' and sometimes because the free exercise
claim was "made within the confines of strictly controlled government
institutions"22 such as prisons23 or the armed forces.
24
" Id. See also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled.- Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberal-
ism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 247 (1991) (defending Smith's abandonment of the conduct ex-
emption).
'5 Id.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17 id.
" McConnell, supra note 4, at 1109. Professor Underkuffier-Freund examined tile Court's
pre-Smith free exercise cases and concluded free exercise claims were invariably denied when-
ever they directly challenged "a prevailing secular norm" or "public, 'secular' action" even in
cases "when the governmental interest involved did not appear to be of a vastly more compel-
ling nature." Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foun-
dational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 W,,. & MARY L. REv. 837, 854 (1995). Moreover,
she concludes that free exercise claims were upheld only when they were "insular, discrete, and
posed no fundamental challenge to the Court's conception of the separation of the religious
from the secular sphere of public life." Id. at 853.
" McConnell, supra note 4, at 1110. McConnell describes the pre-Smith free exercise score-
card as follows: "In fact, after the last major free exercise victory in 1972, the Court rejected
every claim requesting exemption from burdensome laws or policies to come before it except
for those claims involving unemployment compensation, which were governed by clear prece-
dent." Id. The 1972 case referred to by McConnell is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in
which the Court upheld the right of Amish parents to remove their children from formal
schooling after the eighth grade.
" See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (find-
ing that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the United States Forrest Service from con-
structing a paved road on federal land that would irreparably damage a sacred site used by Na-
tive Americans for religious rituals); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting the claim that
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the federal government from requiring states to se social
security numbers in administering welfare programs). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Be-
gin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989). In this
class of cases, the Court avoided applying strict scrutiny "by holding that the harms inflicted by
the challenged government policies were not of the sort that would trigger the protections of
the free exercise clause." Id. at 935.
" See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that there was a
compelling governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education).
n Lupu, supra note 20, at 934 n.6.
See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that prison officials are not
required to accommodate the requests of Muslim inmates for scheduling changes in order to
attend religious services on Friday afternoons).
" See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the Air Force is not re-
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In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
"does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply ith a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability '" 5 even if the law pro-
hibits conduct that his religion requires or requires conduct that his
religion forbids. Thus, the State of Oregon had the power to enforce
"an across-the-board criminal prohibition""" of the drug peyote
against members of the Native American Church who ingested the
drug as a sacrament at a worship service. "* Remarkably, the Smith
Court decreed this dramatic transformation of "existing law without
an opportunity for briefing or argument, and it issued an opinion
claiming that its new rules had been the law for a hundred years."-4
The Bible says that fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowl-
edge,' 9 but fear of religious pluralism is the root of Justice Scalia's
much-malignede majority opinion in Stmith Indeed, the opinion's
free exercise revisionism appears to have been determined by a for-
mula that can be stated as follows: Religious Pluralism plus Religious
Liberty equals Anarchy. As Scalia explicitly put it, any society that
protects religiously motivated conduct under a compelling interest
test is "courting anarchy, [and] that danger increases in direct pro-
portion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determi-
nation to coerce or suppress none of them."' For Scalia, religious
freedom in a "cosmopolitan nation" is a "luxury"1: that is unafford-
able because it renders "each conscience... a law unto itself" and
encourages demands for religious exemptions "from civic obligations
of almost every conceivable kind."" This free-exercise-phobia that
quired to accommodate Jewish officer's request to wear yarmulke indoors).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee., 455 L'.S.
252, 263 n.3 (1982)). As a student commentator has observed, Smith -identified a formal cate-
gory of laws and regulations-the neutral and generally applicable-that are not subject to am
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause...." Kenneth D. Sansom, Note. Shianng the Burdern
Exploring the Space Between Unifarm and Specific Applicabilit " in Current Free ExercreJunspm7diee. 77
TEX. L REV. 753, 760 (1999).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Id. at 874. Since a general criminal prohibition of peyote uas consistent ith the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, the state of Oregon was also free to impose a lesser burden on Respondents by
withholding unemployment compensation after they had been discharged from work because
of their use of peyote. Id. at 890.
Laycock, supra note 5, at 1.
Prov. 1:7.
For scholarly criticism of Smith, see, e.g., Laycock. supra note 5; McConnell. supra note 4.
In her opinion concurring in the judgment in Smith, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority
for giving only "a strained reading of the First Amendment" and also for "disregard[ing]" the
Court's established free exercise jurisprudence. Smith, 494 U.S. at 892 (O'Connor. J.. concur-
ring). Even one of Smith's most ardent defenders acknowledges that the Court's opinion is
neither persuasive nor well-crafted. It exhibits only a shallow understanding of free exercise
jurisprudence and its use of precedent borders on fiction." William P. Marshall, In DOfrnse of
Smith and Free Exerise Reisinism, 58 U. CHI. L RE%,. 308, 308-09 (1991).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
Id
Id. at 890.
Id at 888.
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animates Scalia's opinion in Smith has been described eloquently by
Ira Lupu: Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral march; grant
this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted
with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants
of every stripe. s
In Smith, the voice whispering in Justice Scalia's ear warned him
that a strongly protective free exercise doctrine would place at risk
not only drug laws but also laws dealing with compulsory military serv-
ice, payment of taxes, manslaughter, child neglect, compulsory vacci-
nation, traffic regulation, minimum wages, child labor, animal cru-
elty, environmental protection, and racial equality. 6  In short, the
social contracts7 itself might not survive a constitutional rule protect-
ing religiously motivated conduct from governmental restrictions.
William Marshall argues that the results in Smith should be ap-
plauded because free exercise exemptions for religiously-motivated
conduct promote "inequality" by creating "a constitutional prefer-
ence for religious over non-religious belief systems."" According to
Marshall, when a court grants a free exercise claim, the effect is to
unfairly "insulate religious beliefs from social forces" while "compet-
ing secular beliefs... must stand or fall on their own accord." 9
Both Scalia and Marshall raise legitimate concerns. A strong Free
Exercise Clause clearly operates to insulate religious "deviants" and
dissenters from the assimilative force of restrictive laws and policies
enacted by the majority.40 Moreover, since the Free Exercise Clause
protects only the exercise of religion, those who seek exemptions for
non-religious conduct are not protected. Thus, a student who wishes
to be excused from school to observe a religious holy day is indeed
treated differently under the Free Exercise Clause from one who
' Lupu, supra note 20, at 947. Lupu's article was published before Smith was decided, but it
eloquently captures the panic that religious liberty seems to trigger in the imagination ofJustice
Scalia.
' Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.
7 See Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 563,
567 (1998) (noting the fear of free exercise "[I]urking beneath the surface of many appellate
opinions.").
Marshall, supra note 30, at 319.
Id at 322. Philip Kurland made the same point more bluntly almost forty years ago: "To
permit individuals to be excused from compliance with the law solely on the basis of religious
beliefs is to subject others to punishment for failure to subscribe to those same beliefs." Philip
B. Kurland, Of Church And State And The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1961). Of
course, as Michael McConnell responds, the First Amendment doesn't prefer religious belief;
rather, it "treats religious belief differently--sometimes better, sometimes worse, depending on
whether the context is one of interference or advancement." Michael W. McConnell, A Response
To Professor MarshaU, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 331 (1991).
, "The unifying principle" of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses "is that the relig-
ious life of the people should be insulated, to the maximum possible degree, from the effect of
governmental action, whether favorable or unfavorable." McConnell, supra note 39, at 331-32.
[Vol. 3:3
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wishes the day off to attend a gothic rock concert, the World Series,
or even a political campaign rally."
However, if a highly protective free exercise doctrine sometimes
limits the ability of political majorities to rule, a rigid application of
the doctrine of Smith exposes religious minorities to a substantial risk
of persecution2 and unleashes "the forces of homogenization."' In
1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, the size of government
was minimal and religious diversity "consisted mostly of Protestant
pluralism."" Today, however, "the scope of pluralism and the scope
of government are both vastly greater."" If the Free Exercise Clause
is viewed as enacting a zero-sum game between democracy and relig-
ious pluralism, we will all lose something of inestimable -alue. How-
ever, there is no reason to think that the lion of democracy cannot lie
down in peace with the lamb of religious liberty. The best reading of
the free exercise doctrine of Smith and its progeny recognizes that a
democratic society can indeed coexist with a strong commitment to
religious pluralism and tolerance.
Although the general rule of Smith allowing government to restrict
religious exercise has received much more attention, the most impor-
tant parts of the decision's doctrine are those creating a number of
potentially broad exceptions that explicitly provide the highest de-
gree of protection for religious liberty.4" These exceptions are now
the principal source of constitutional protection for religious liberty,
and understanding their existence and development in the post-Smith
caselaw is therefore of critical importance to the religious freedom
community.
" See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (holding that the denial of unem-
ployment compensation benefits violated petitioner's free exercise rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (holding that the free exercise rights of Amish families were violated
by enforcement of Wisconsin's mandatory school-attendance law). In both Yodr and Taras.
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not protect conduct motivated only by secu-
lar considerations. In Thomas, the Court expressly declared: 'Only beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the
exercise of religion." 450 U.S. at 713.
Laycock, supra note 5, at 4, 29-30.
McConnell, supra note 8, at 138.
Laycock, supra note 5, at 68.
"Id.
Indeed, religious liberty claims protected under the exceptions recognized in Smith are
entitled to more protection than they would have received under pre-Smith free exercise juris-
prudence. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 ("The compelling interest standard that we apply once a
law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not 'uater[ed] ... down' but 'really means uhat it
says.'"). This conclusion will be discussed in depth throughout the remainder of this article.
May 2001]
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B. The Smith Exceptions: Herein of Belief Hybrids
and Non-General Applicability
1. Religious Belief
The Smith opinion was based in part on the discredited distinction
between religious belief and conduct. Thus, "the peyote worshipers
of Oregon, 4 were free to "believe their religion but not [to] practice
it. '48 Nevertheless, it is clear that a great deal of protection remains
under the First Amendment against laws restricting religious beliefs
or the institutional autonomy of churches. According to the Court,
at least this much is true:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to be-
lieve and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First
Amendment obviously excludes all "governmental regulation of religious
beliefs as such .... " The government may not compel affirmation of relig-
ious belief, ... punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to
be false .... impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or
religious status .... or lend its power to one or the other side in contro-
versies over religious authority or dogma.49
On the other hand, as Justice Scalia was quick to observe, "the'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but
the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts.... ."" Thus,
the right of religious belief and profession does not include the right
to engage in religiously motivated conduct.5 To use one of Scalia's
examples, the right to believe in the "sacramental use of bread and
wine" does not protect the act of receiving Holy Communion.52 If the
Free Exercise Clause continues to protect the exercise of religion at the
dawn of the new millennium, it must be under one of the other ex-
ceptions recognized by the Court in Smith.
' Laycock, supra note 5, at 22.
* Id.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citations omitted). However, "in the history of the Court's adjudi-
cation of free exercise claims, only once has the Court recognized clear governmental coercion
of religious belief: the required declaration of belief in God for the holding of public office."
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 18, at 852.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 877. Douglas Laycock has observed that the belief-conduct distinction echoes Oliver
Cromwell's understanding of religious liberty. Although Cromwell claimed to "meddle not with
any man's conscience," he made clear that "if by liberty of conscience you mean a liberty to ex-
ercise the mass, Ijudge it best to use plain dealing, and to let you know, where the Parliament
of England have power, that will not be allowed of." Laycock, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting
CHRISTOPHER HILL, GOD'S ENGLISHMAN: OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 121
(1970)). Laycock concludes that "[tihe only difference between Scalia's definition of religious
liberty and Cromwell's is that Scalia requires formal neutrality." Id.
[Vol. 3:3
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2. Free Exercise "Hybrid" Claims and the Demise and
Reincarnation ofYoder
For almost two decades prior to Smith, constitutional law students
were taught that Wisconsin v. Yode ' w%-as a major landmark of the Su-
preme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Yoderis the 1972 decision
which held that Wisconsin's formally neutral compulsory attendance
laws could not be enforced against Old Order Amish parents who de-
clined to send their children to public or private school beyond the
eighth grade. 4 In order to avoid overruling Yoderas inconsistent ith
the general thrust of Smith's new free exercise doctrine, Scalia as-
serted that Yoder was not a free exercise decision at all, but rather a
"hybrid" case.5' A "hybrid" case is one in which the Free Exercise
Clause can be linked to another constitutional claim, such as free
speech, freedom of association, or substantive due process. Thus,
Yoderis like a moth that experienced pupation for nearly two decades
in a free exercise cocoon only to emerge in Smith as a hybrid case in-
volving both free exercise and parental rights.
The mechanics of the hybrid theory work something like this:
neither free exercise nor parental rights standing alone can reach the
results in Yoder, 7 but somehow when the two claims are "hybridized"
or linked together they can do the work. Thus, two insufficient con-
stitutional interests-when combined-equal one sufficient hybrid
claim.ss In his concurring opinion in Lukumi, Justice Souter de-
scribed hybrid claims as "untenable"r9 and proceeded to deconstruct
the hybrid concept:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so m-ast -as to
swvallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 213-15, 234-35.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
Id.
In Yoder, the Court made clear that a parental claim "based on purely secular considera-
tions," such as those based upon the writings and philosophy of Thoreau. -ma% not be inter-
posed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education." 4U US. at 21-16,
The mathematics of Yoderas a hybrid case are Pickwickian: Free Exercise Clause satisfied
plus Due Process Clause satisfied equals Constitution unsatisfied. The h~brid concept ms not
be an entirely new idea in constitutional law. It might. for euample. explain how the Court. in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), constructed a right to possess obscene publicauons in
the home. Although Stanley involved a lawful search under the Fourth Amendment and ob-
scene materials which generally are not protected by the First Amendment. the Curt held that
possession of obscene material in the privacy of one's home could not coststutinal'. be made
a crime. Id. at 559, 568. The Court expressly indicated that the case had an 'added dimension"
because a privacy interest was linked to a free speech interest. Id. at 561. The arithmeuc of
Stad*nley-rst amendment satisfied plus fourth amendment satisfied equals Constitution unsatis-
fied"--is no less paradoxical than that of the Court in Smith. Gerard V. Bradlev, Rema..ng the
Constitutiow A Critical Reexamination of the Bowers v. Hardwick Dutt. 25 WAKE FOREs" L RE'.
501,512 (1990).
' 508 U.S. at 567 (SouterJ., concurring).
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situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights
are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one
in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally
neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls
the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.0
Souter's argument is powerful. If Yoder survives Smith, as either a
free exercise case or a hybrid case, the judgment in Smith is difficult
to support. If Yoderis a free exercise case, then the claimants in Smith
were entitled to strict scrutiny when Oregon restricted their use of
sacramental peyote. On the other hand, if Yoder is understood as a
hybrid case, the claims in Smith should have received heightened pro-
tection as religion-speech-association hybrids. The Court did not
reach this issue in Smith only because the case was decided without
briefing or argument on this (as yet) undiscovered First Amendment
concept.6'
Of course, the concept of hybrid claims is not completely irra-
tional. Although it is certainly true that zero plus zero does not equal
one, it is equally true that the sum of a number of fractions-one-half
plus one-half, for example-may equal one. Yoder, indeed, is a case in
which Wisconsin's mandatory attendance laws implicated not only re-
ligious liberty interests, but also free speech, association, and parental
rights. Even if no single strand of the constitutional interests at stake
in a case like Yoder is sufficient to trigger heightened constitutional
protection, it is possible to argue that the cumulative effect of all
these interests is sufficient.62
Regardless of the intellectual merits of the hybrid theory, it is still
law until the Court holds otherwise, and it is malpractice not to plead
hybrid claims in free exercise litigation. Hybrid claims may be par-
ticularly helpful in litigating disputes between religious families and
public schools, because these cases always involve multiple compo-
nents. A good example is Alabama and Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy
Independent School District." Big Sandy involved a free exercise chal-
w Id.
6' In Smith, both Petitioners and Respondents assumed the Free Exercise Clause required
strict scrutiny, and their briefs and arguments focused on whether the State of Oregon had sat-
isfied the compelling interest test on the facts of the case. Id. at 571-72. "[Nieither party
squarely addressed the proposition the Court was to embrace, that the Free Exercise Clause was
irrelevant to the dispute." Id. at 572.
6I would like to acknowledge the Religion Law e-mail discussion group, available at relig-
ionlaw@listserve.ucla.edu, and, in particular, Dean Robert Destro for stimulating my thinking
on this point.
"Whatever the theoretical explanation for... [hybrid claims], a great many free exercise
claims might be recast to take advantage of this construct." Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division
v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REv. 259, 266 (1993). For an ex-
tensive discussion of hybrid cases in the lower courts, see William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious
Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 211 (1998).
817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993), remanded for further consideration, 20 F.3d 469 (5th Cir.
[Vol. 3:3
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lenge by Native American students to a school hair code that re-
quired boys to grow their hair "no longer than the top of a standard
dress collar."5 The court held that the claim was a hybrid and ap-
plied strict scrutiny under Smith, because the students' free exercise
claim was reinforced both by a free speech claim and a parental
rights claim.6
3. Laws that are not Neutral or Generally Applicable
Under the general rule of Smith, the Free Exercise Clause is stifled
only by neutral laws of general application. If religious practice is re-
stricted by a law that is not neutral or not generally applicable, free
exercise claims are protected by the compelling interest tesL 7 Thus,
the key issue in religious liberty litigation has become locating the
borders of neutrality and general applicability.
In Smith, the Court assumed-without analysis-that the Oregon pe-
yote law was "an across-the-board criminal prohibition o[f] a particu-
lar form of conduct."6' Thus, there was no need to distinguish and
precisely define the concepts of neutrality and general applicability.
Scalia did concede that the Free Exercise Clause would be violated if
a state "sought to ban [certain] acts or abstentions only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious be-
lief that they display."69 Thus, a law "specifically directed" at relig-
ion,'0 such as one banning "the casting of 'statues that are to be used
for worship purposes,'"' would "doubtless [ly] be unconstitutional.
" "
There is an infinity of hard cases that lies between an "across-the-
board criminal prohibition" s and a law that "specifically directs" a
restriction only at religiously motivated behavior. Imagine, for ex-
ample, three states with different approaches to the prohibition of al-
coholic beverages. State A enacts a total prohibition of possession
and distribution of alcoholic beverages. State B prohibits only the
sacramental use of alcoholic beverages. Finally, the prohibition law
enacted in State C is widely applicable, but contains an exception that
permits alcoholic beverages to be served with meals at restaurants.
How does the opinion in Smith inform our analysis when these laws
are enforced against churches that use alcoholic wine for the Lord's
1994).
Id. at 1323.
Id at 1332.
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying texL
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,884 (1990).
Id. at 877.
Id at 878.
' Id. at 877-78.
Id at 877.
Id at 884.
7, Id at 878.
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Supper?
The prohibition laws in State A and State B are easy cases. State A
has enacted a neutral and generally applicable law-an "across-the-
board" prohibition of alcoholic beverages. " Under Smith, there is no
free exercise claim; Christians are free to believe in the sacrament of
Holy Communion, but they may not perform the act of drinking sac-
ramental wine from the cup. State B's prohibition law, however, is
unconstitutional because it prohibits alcoholic beverages only when
they are used in religious rituals.
Although the first two prohibition laws are thus clearly controlled
by Smith, the opinion has little to say about laws like State C's prohibi-
tion statute, and what little guidance Scalia provides is internally con-
flicting. On the one hand, Scalia's example of a neutral and gener-
ally applicable law is that of an "across-the-board criminal
prohibition. 77  On the other hand, his example of a non-neutral,
non-generally-applicable law is one that singles out religious conduct
for direct persecution.7 s State C's prohibition statute is neither of
these. The law is not specifically directed at sacramental wine, but it
is discriminatory in the sense that it permits alcoholic beverages to be
served in restaurants but not in churches or anywhere else. Ironi-
cally, whenever the law is enforced against a church for providing
Communion wine to worshipers, elsewhere in State C gourmands will
be permitted to enjoy a carafe of wine with brunch at their favorite
local bistro. If State C's prohibition law is constitutional, Smith's crit-
ics are correct when they lament about the end of religious liberty in
America.79
4. Sherbert Transformed: Laws with "A System of Individual Exemptions"
Although Smith is widely understood as having rejected the free
exercise doctrine established in Sherbert,s° it is important to remember
that Smith did not overrule Sherbert!" According to the Court in Smith,
the "Sherbert test... was developed in a context that lent itself to indi-
vidualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
See id at 884 (noting the general applicability of across-the-board criminal prohibition).
' See id. at 877 (stating that a state could not "ban such acts or abstentions only when they
are engaged in for religious reasons.").
Id. at 884.
Id. at 877-78.
' See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. For an analysis suggesting that the general
applicability requirement is not satisfied by laws such as State C's selective prohibition statute,
see infra Parts II.C and III.
o See supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text.
AsJustice Souter has observed, Smith has created "a free-exercise jurisprudence in tension
with itself" because it rejected the doctrine of earlier free exercise cases, such as Yoder and Sher-
bert, but simultaneously "left those prior cases standing." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564 (1993) (Souter,J., concurring).
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conduct"s2 and therefore is best understood as standing "for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'relig-
ious hardship' without compelling reason. " '
In other words, Smith reclassified Sherbert as a case in which strict
scrutiny was properly applied because free exercise w-as unequally
burdened by South Carolina's individualized-and thus non-generally-
applicable-unemployment compensation process. The South Caro-
lina law was not generally applicable, because an applicant was ineli-
gible for unemployment benefits if the Employment Security Com-
mission made a finding that the applicant had failed without "good
cause" to accept "suitable work.""' Since the Commission w-as em-
powered to grant "good cause" or "suitability" exemptions to those
who had refused work for certain secular reasons, such as an appli-
cant's physical fitness, prior earnings, and prospects for securing local
work in his or her customary occupation, but refused to grant a simi-
lar exemption to Mrs. Sherbert when she declined employment for
religious reasons, the law was tainted by a selective process and,
therefore, was not generally applicable." Such an individualized ex-
emption process "provides ample opportunity for discrimination
against religion in general or unpopular faiths in particular."
Therefore, any refusal to extend discretionary exemptions to claims
of religious hardship must be strictly scrutinized.' Although some
commentators view the individualized exemption process rule as "de-
riving from suspicion" of laws that grant "government agents substan-
tial discretion in determining the scope of the law's coverage and en-
forcement with respect to a fundamental right,"' the rule is best
understood as nothing more than a subset of the general applicability
requirement.
Notice that the employment compensation scheme in Slerbert did
not recognize all secular reasons for refusing work as qualifying for
the "good cause" or "suitability" exemptions. Some secular reasons,
such as the applicant's prior earnings or customary occupation, were
considered good reasons for refusing work, while other secular rea-
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1963).
See id (describing process for granting "good cause" and 'suitabilit" exemptions).
Laycock, supra note 5, at 48.
See id. at 49-50.
Gedicks, supra note 4, at 115.
"If the potential for an indihidualized secular exemption" requires strict scrutim %%hen
religious exemptions are denied, "then a fortiori a whole class of secular exemptions" enacted
by the legislature should entitle religious claimants to strict scrutiny when they are restricted by
such unequal laws. Laycock, supra note 5. at 50. In other words. "[wholes-de secular excep-
tions make [a] law even less generally applicable titan indiidualized secular exceptions."
Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Cour and Religious Liberty, 40 CTti. Lw. 25.32 (2000).
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sons were not considered acceptable. 9 Smith's reconceptualization of
Sherbert states that when the government has in place a system of indi-
vidual exemptions, it must treat religious exemption claims as well as
the most favored secular exemption claims, even if this means that re-
ligious claims are treated better than the disfavored subset of secular
exemption claims. In other words, the government may not refuse to
treat religious reasons for exemptions as well as the preferred secular
reasons without compelling justification. 9'
This is potentially a very significant free exercise rule, because
whenever you are dealing with burdensome regulations administered
by governmental departments, public schools, state universities, or
similar bureaucracies, there will often be some process for requesting
an exemption, waiver, or variance. Even if the regulation or restric-
tive policy is generally applicable on its face, if a state agency grants
ad hoc exemptions, waivers, or variances in even a few cases involving
secular claims, it may not refuse to grant similar exemptions, waivers,
or variances in cases of "religious hardship" without satisfying strict
scrutiny.
For example, suppose a state law school requires all students to
enroll as full-time students during their first year of study. However,
assume also that over the years the law faculty has granted a small
number of exemptions from the requirement for students who re-
quest part-time status to accommodate various personal or family
hardships. Perhaps the faculty has granted part-time status to first
year students who are single parents, or who are caring for aged par-
ents, or whose petition for a waiver is accompanied by a supporting
letter from a member of the state legislature. Must the law college
grant a religious exemption to a student who wishes to enroll on a
part-time basis to accommodate his volunteer work at a shelter and
evangelical outreach for the homeless operated as a ministry by the
student's church? Under Smith and Sherbert, the answer is yes; since
the law school has in place "a system of individual exemptions," it
must either grant the religious exemption or be prepared to pass
strict scrutiny.
Smith's reinterpretation of Sherbert may be of particular importance
when a church or other religious institution is burdened by zoning or
other land use restrictions. Land use regulations often contain indi-
vidualized procedures for determining which parcels of land are re-
" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400 n.3 (1963) (quoting the South Carolina Unem-
ployment Compensation Act which details what factors to consider when determining if work is
suitable for an individual).
" I am indebted to various posts to the Religion Law list, and in particular to Michael
McConnell's insights, for enriching my understanding of Smith's reconceptualization of Sherbert.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) ("[O]ur decisions in the unem-
ployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without
compelling reason.").
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stricted and which are unrestricted," and the existence of these ad
hoc procedures should trigger strict scrutiny when claims to exempt
religious land uses from burdensome restrictions are denied.9'
C. Lukumi, Religious Genymanders and Underinclusiveness
As previously discussed, laws such as the hypothetical prohibition
statute of State C, which exempts alcoholic beverages served with
meals at restaurants from an otherwise across-the-board prohibition,
raise interesting questions concerning the meaning of the general
applicability requirement mandated by Smith. When Smith and Lu-
kumi are read together, a persuasive argument can be made that laws
such as State C's are not generally applicable and may not be en-
forced against religiously motivated dissenters absent a compelling
justification. Indeed, under Lukumi religious liberty ill often receive
greater protection than under pre-Smith law, because the Court has
made clear that it will no longer apply a "watered down" version of
the compelling interest test for free exercise claims that meet Smith's
requirements.-
Lukumi concerned a regulatory scheme that had been gerryman-
dered to prohibit the killing of animals only when done as part of a
religious ritual.96 The Court held that this enactment was neither
neutral97 nor generally applicable.9" Therefore, when the Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye challenged the law as a violation of its right
to practice a religious ritual of animal sacrifice, the Court applied
' "Land use regulation is among the most individualized and least generally applicable bod-
ies of law in our legal system." Douglas Laycock. State RFRAs and Land Or Regulatin, 32 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 755, 767 (1999). Moreover, as Laycock correctly observes, zoning laws that restrict
the right to assemble on private property for worship or religious ministry strike "at the very
core of religious liberty." Id at 755-56
See; e.g., Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland. 940 F. Supp. 879. 886 (D. Md.
1996) (historic preservation ordinance creates a system of individualized exemptions; compel-
ling interest test applied); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P. 2d 174. 181 (Wash.
1992) (landmark ordinance contained "mechanisms for individualized exceptions.") However.
some courts take the position that "any law not motivated by hostility to religion in general. or
to a particular faith, is a generally applicable law" even if it is substantially underinclusive and
even if it "is applied through individualized assessments that [burden] churches %%ith gross dis-
proportion." Laycock, supra note 93, at 768-69. Sc, e.g., Rector of S. Bartholomew's Church v.
City of NewYork, 914 F.2d 348,355 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that absent evidence of'discrimina-
tory motive," New York City's landmarks law "is a valid, neutral regulation of general applicabi-
ity."). The recently enacted Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 rill
also protect religious liberty whenever any governmental land use regulation substantially bur-
dens religious exercise. Pub. L No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
Id at 534-40.
Id. at 542.
Id at 545-46.
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authentic strict scrutiny" and held that the law violated the "funda-
mental nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment."'"0
1. Strict Scrutiny That "Really Means Mhat It Says"
In Lukumi, the Court held that Smith acts as a gatekeeper to the
Promised Land of strict scrutiny for religious liberty.'' In other
words, if the general rule of Smith is applicable, the religious liberty
claim will receive no protection under the Free Exercise Clause; how-
ever, "once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements," the Court
held that the free exercise claim will be protected by a compelling in-
terest test that "is not 'water[ed] ... down' but 'really means what it
says,"' one that the state will be able to satisfy "only in rare cases. '
Thus, when a free exercise claim is brought against a law that is
both neutral and generally applicable, the gatekeeper function of
Smith applies and the law normally will be upheld against the free ex-
ercise challenge. However, if a law is either not neutral or not gener-
ally applicable,' 3 it must pass through the gauntlet of superlatives that
is strict scrutiny and will be upheld only if it advances a governmental
interest "of the highest order" and is narrowly tailored in pursuit of
that truly compelling interest.14
This is a good news/bad news scenario for religious liberty. The
bad news is that some worthwhile religious liberty claims will be
summarily rejected under Smith's general rule when brought against
truly neutral and generally applicable governmental restrictions. The
good news is that some religious liberty claims will receive surpass-
ingly strict protection under Lukumi's rigorous compelling interest
test, when brought against laws that fail to satisfy Smith's requirements
of neutrality and general applicability. Whether the good news out-
weighs the bad news depends upon the lines drawn by the Court
marking the boundaries of neutral laws and generally applicable laws.
Although the Court has not yet settled on a final map, the prelimi-
nary lines sketched in Lukumi bode well for the state of religious
freedom.
Id. at 546-47.
'9 Id. at 523.
*0* See id. at 546 (noting that "once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements" the Court will
apply a very strict compelling interest test).
102 id.
- Since hybrid claims are not covered by Smith's restrictive general rule, these claims pre-
sumably are also entitled to the rigorous strict scrutiny established in Lukumi. See supra notes
52-66 and accompanying text.
' 9 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
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2. The Neutrality Requirement
Although neutrality and general applicability are "interrelated"
concepts and the failure to satisfy one of these requirements is "a
likely indication that the other has not been satisfied,""' Luhumi rec-
ognized that these requirements are not identical. The neutrality re-
quirement mandates formal as opposed to substantive neutrality "
and generally will be satisfied if the law in question neither targets re-
ligious practices for special burdens nor adopts classifications that
discriminate on the basis of religion."' The requirement of general
applicability, however, is concerned with laws that are underinclusive
in the sense of failing "to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endan-
gers [state] ... interests in a similar or greater degree" than the re-
stricted religious conduct that is the subject of the free exercise
claim.108
Only in rare instances will strict scrutiny be triggered by the neu-
trality requirement, because it forbids only the most direct forms of
religious persecution. The requirement will be satisfied unless the
object or purpose of the law is to suppress religiously motivated con-
duct "because of [the] ... religious motivation."" Laws that facially
target a particular religious practice, such as laws prohibiting peyote
or alcoholic wine only when used for sacramental purposes, lack facial
neutrality and will be subject to strict scrutiny under Luhumi."' Simi-
larly, laws that discriminate "against some or all religious beliefs" do
not satisfy the neutrality requirement..'
' Id. at 531.
The term "formal neutrality" basically adopts a "standard of no religious classificauons.-
Douglas Laycock, Fornal Substantie, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Rligion, 39 DEPAL L.
REV. 993, 999 (1990). Substantive neutrality on the other hand goes beyond tie face of a law
and examines its effects. It asks whether government action 'encourages or discourages relig-
ious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." Id at 1001.
Substantive neutrality is satisfied "when government encouragement and discouragement [of
religious belief or practice] is minimized." Id. at 1002. An across-the-board prohibition of the
use of peyote thus satisfies the requirements of formal neutrality, but probably fails the test of
substantive neutrality as applied to the sacramental use of pc)ote by members of tie Nause
American Church. Id. at 1003.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532-40.
Id. at 543. The general applicability requirement will be analyzed extensielv ufra Part
II.C.3.
. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
' Id. In Smith, the Court stated that a law prohibiting the "casting of 'statues that are to be
used for worship purposes'" or one forbidding "bowing down before a golden calf" would vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872. 877-78 (1990). These
laws fail to satisfy the neutrality requirement because they restrict particular kinds of conduct
.only when they are engaged in for religious reasons." Id. at 877.
". Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532. For example, an across-the-board prohibition of alcohol with an
exception for the Catholic Church (but not other denominations) to use sacramnental wine cre-
ates a discriminatory religious classification and thus fails the neutrality requirement. Richard
F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Churdz: Homosexual Rights Legulaton, Putbhe Pohe', and Rigous
Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. RE%,. 393, 423 (1994). Se alsoMcDaniel v. Paty. 433 U.S. 618 (19781
(invalidating a state law that disqualified members of the clergy from serving in certain public
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In Lukumi, the Court invalidated a scheme of legal restrictions in-
volving both a pattern of exemptions and a pattern of narrow prohi-
bitions, because the scheme amounted to a gerrymander designed to
prohibit the killing of animals only when done for religious pur-
poses. 2 The gerrymander singled out a religious practice-Santeria
animal sacrifice-for discriminatory treatment and thereby violated
the neutrality requirement.
Although the neutrality requirement is an important component
of free exercise doctrine under Smith and Lukumi, it is dwarfed by the
potential significance of the general applicability requirement. Jus-
tice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lukumi has much to say about the
meaning of general applicability and the scope of this exception from
Smith's general rule.
3. The General Applicability Requirement
Since a law that is not neutral will never be generally applicable, a
law that fails the neutrality test must also fail the test of general appli-
cability. However, it does not follow that a law that satisfies the for-
mer requirement will always satisfy the latter. For example, imagine a
law that does not target a particular religious practice or classify on
the basis of religion, but which does contain one or a few exceptions
for favored secular interests. Suppose a state enacts a (nearly) across-
the-board prohibition law that contains a single exception permitting
alcoholic beverages to be served with meals at restaurants. This law is
certainly widely applicable, but is it generally applicable? If this law is
enforced against sacramental uses of alcoholic wine, is the Free Exer-
cise Clause irrelevant under Smith, or should rigorous strict scrutiny
be applied under Lukumi?
In Lukumi, the Court did not need to "define with precision the
standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general applica-
tion," because the ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice had been
gerrymandered to target a particular religious ritual and thus fell
"well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amend-
ment rights."' 13  However, the Court did provide at least a rough
sketch of the boundaries of general applicability.
It is very significant that the Court stated that a law that directly
targets religion falls "well below" the minimum requirement of gen-
eral applicability, because this indicates that facial neutrality is a nec-
essary, but not a sufficient, condition of generality. The neutrality
requirement is designed to forbid direct religious persecution, how-
offices).
"2 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536-40. "Indeed, careful drafting ensured that, although Santeria sac-
rifice is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all other circum-
stances are unpunished." Id. at 536.
", Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
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ever, the "precise evil" prohibited by the general applicability re-
quirement is the inequality that results when underinclusive legal
prohibitions are enforced against religious conduct.'" When society
is unwilling to impose the same legal restrictions on favored secular
activities that it imposes on religious practices of the same kind, that
"evil" is resent and renders the constitutionality of the legal scheme
doubfiail. 5 As justice Kennedy put it, "[a] 11 laws are selective to some
extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a
law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice. " "'
Certainly, when a restriction is advanced "only against conduct
with a religious motivation," ' 7 that law is well below the standard of
general applicability. However, it seems equally clear that at least
some laws that stop short of targeting religion-laws that do not di-
rectly restrict religious conduct as such, but contain at least some
"categories of selection" that impose incidental burdens on religious
exercise-are perhaps less than "well below," but nevertheless, still be-
low the minimum standard of general applicability.
Although it was not necessary for the Court in Lulhmi to provide
the precise standard for evaluating a law's general applicability,"" it
did provide a very useful general formula. A law that is underinclu-
sive in the sense of failing to restrict certain "nonreligious conduct
that endangers" state interests, "in a similar or greater degree" than
the restricted religious conduct is not generally applicable, at least
when the "underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential.""' For
example, the city ordinances struck down in Lukumi were designed to
promote the city's interest in protecting the public health, which was
said to be threatened by the improper disposal of animal carcasses
and the consumption of uninspected meat. However, the city did
not prohibit hunting and certain other secular activities that equally
endangered these public health concerns.'2' These ordinances were
thus substantially underinclusive and therefore failed the test of gen-
eral applicability. '22
"' Id. at 545-46.
1Id
Id. at 542.
" Id. at 543.
1 I. It was not necessary for the Court to determine the precise boundar) of general appli-
cability in Lukumi, because the law struck down in that case w%-as a religious gerrymander that fell
well below the minimum standard.
" Id. For a thoughtful student note discussing Lulwrrn and general applicability. see Sa-
som, supra note 25.
- Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 544-45.
Ml II&
'- Id. at 544-46. See Horen v. Virginia. 479 S.E.2d 553 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a Law
prohibiting possession of owl feathers was not generally applicable under Lukurn because it
contained secular exceptions for taxidermists, academics, researchers, nusums, and educa-
tional institutions); Sansom, supra note 25. at 770-71 (describing the inconsistent treatment of
religious and secular activity under the ordinances in Lukumni as a failure of general applicabil-
ity).
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In the next section of this article, I will argue that, properly un-
derstood, the concept of underinclusiveness is the key both to ensur-
ing a minimum level of protection for religious liberty in the Consti-
tution and to assuaging the legitimate concern that constitutional
protection of religiously motivated conduct in a pluralistic society
risks anarchy. I will conclude that a strong commitment to religious
liberty, far from being a threat to civilization and the social compact,
is a necessary part of the good in a religiously pluralistic society that
aspires to be both tolerant and free.
III. BEYOND THE MILLENNIUM: UNDERINCLUSIVE LAWS AND
EQUAL REGARD FOR RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
Although Lukumi stopped short of providing the precise standard
for measuring a law's general applicability, it cast a considerable de-
gree of light on the problem. We know that "categories of selection"
and "underinclusion" are the earmarks of laws which, although fa-
cially neutral with respect to religion, fail to satisfy the requirement of
general applicability. A law can be selective or underinclusive either
because it contains express exceptions for certain favored classes of
behavior or because the narrow scope of its restrictions leaves certain
classes of behavior unregulated. For example, there is no material
difference between a law that prohibits all alcoholic beverages with
an express exception for alcoholic beverages served with meals at res-
taurants and a law that prohibits all alcoholic beverages not served
with meals at restaurants. These two laws are equally selective in im-
posing their restrictions, and thus equally in compliance (or equally
not in compliance) with the general applicability requirement.' 3
In order to determine if a law restricting religious exercise is un-
derinclusive, one must ask two questions. First, what governmental
purposes are being served by the restrictive law at issue? Second,
does the law exempt or otherwise leave unrestricted secular conduct
that endangers those governmental purposes in a similar or greater
degree than the prohibited or restricted conduct of the party seeking
the protection of the Free Exercise Clause? In other words, a law
burdening religious conduct is underinclusive, with respect to any
particular government interest, if the law fails to pursue that interest
uniformly against other conduct that causes similar damage to that
government interest. 124
'" "[W]hat is at some time or place a broad rule with an accompanying exception is at other
times a narrow rule having no need for an exception to perform the same prescriptive task."
Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873 (1991). By focusing on underinclu-
siveness as the standard for the general applicability requirement, Lukumi does not allow trivial
formal distinctions between broad rules with exceptions and equally selective narrow rules
without exceptions to obscure the substantive analysis when determining whether a challenged
law satisfies the requirement. Id.
"' The unrestricted secular conduct does not have to be the same activity as the proscribed
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In determining whether a particular law is underinclusive, the
relevant governmental purposes are those that justify the scheme of
restrictions, not those that justify the exemptions or selective cover-
age. For example, our hypothetical prohibition law uas probably en-
acted for the purpose of eliminating the harmful physical and moral
consequences associated with the consumption of alcohol. The ex-
ception for restaurants, however, was designed to advance a com-
pletely unrelated purpose-the accommodation of the economic and
social interests of the restaurant industry and its patrons. Although
this second purpose is certainly a legitimate state interest, it is unre-
lated to the purpose that justifies the legal ban on alcohol and there-
fore is not part of the formula for determining whether the law is un-
derinclusive. This hypothetical prohibition law appears to be
underinclusive (and thus not generally applicable), because it leaves
unrestricted a substantial subclass of secular conduct (wine served
with meals at restaurants) that threatens the state's interests in elimi-
nating the harmful consequences of alcoholic beverages at least as
much as the sacramental use of wine that is subject to the law's regu-
latory scheme. In other words, if the state chooses to accommodate a
certain subclass of "harmful" nonreligious consumption of alcoholic
beverages, it must pass strict scrutiny under Luhima if it fails to ac-
commodate equally the consumption of sacramental wine. The deci-
sion to value secular conduct that is not protected by the Constitution
(wine consumption in restaurants) more than religious conduct cov-
ered by the Free Exercise Clause (wine used for religious rituals) is
the kind of unequal treatment that should be the minimum standard
for constitutional protection of religious liberty.
Two recent federal cases-one in the District of Nebraska and one
in the Third Circuit-serve as illuminating "test suites"' for the gen-
eral applicability requirement.
A. Rader v.Johnston
In Rader v. Johnston,-I Douglas Rader, an eighteen-year-old fresh-
man student at the University of Nebraska-Keamey ("UNK"), chal-
religious conduct. Rather, "it can be a different activity with the same effeCL" Lacock. supra
note 89, at 31. As Michael Paulsen has observed, a similar analysis is used by the Court to de-
termine whether a government interest is "compelling." An interest cannot be regarded as
compelling, says Paulsen, "where government fails to uniformly pursue that interest wherever it
arises, but only pursues it occasionally, sporadically, or inconsistently. The lack of systematic
pursuit belies the assertion of compelling importance." Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs
Through it: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 Mo.T. L REv. 249. 264 (1995). To
paraphrase Paulsen, the lack of systematic pursuit also belies the assertion that a selective law is
generally applicable. Id
' A "test suite" is a term used by computer programmers to refer to tests designed to deter-
mine whether a software program works properly. Eugene Volokh. Itmrrdtaf Qurstzans of Re-
ligious Exemptions-A Researdi Agenda uith Test Suites, 21 CRDOZO L REV. 595. 599 ( 1999).
'_ 924 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Neb. 1996).
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lenged a rule that purported to require all full-time freshmen to live
on-campus their freshman year. 27 The rule, however, did not require
"all" freshmen to reside on campus, because exceptions were allowed
for local students commuting from their parents' homes, for students
who were nineteen years of age or older, for married students, and
"on an ad hoc basis at the discretion of [University] administrators.'"2 8
Rader, a devout Christian, petitioned the University for permission to
live off-campus in a Christian Student Fellowship facility located just
across the street from the UNK campus.29 Rader's petition to live off
campus was denied, and he received a letter from a University admin-
istrator threatening to drop him from classes "unless he signed a
housing contract to live in a residence hall." 3' He then brought suit
in federal court seeking to enjoin the housing policy's enforcement
against him on the ground that it violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Is the UNK housing policy generally applicable? Although it is
widely applicable, it is also quite selective. Indeed, the court found
that when all the exceptions to the housing policy are taken into ac-
count, "only 1,600 of the 2,500 freshmen attending UNK are re-
quired" to live in residence halls.'3' Moreover, these categories of se-
lection rendered the policy substantially underinclusive, because the
subclasses of students exempted from the on-campus requirement
endangered the policy's purposes at least as much as Rader's request
to live off campus in the Christian facility. The University adopted
the policy because it believed that student life in the dormitories fos-
ters diversity, promotes tolerance, improves academic achievement132
and, last but almost certainly not least, ensures full occupancy of the
residence halls.'13  These are certainly legitimate interests, but the
University was willing to forego these academic and fiscal benefits in
order to accommodate the subclasses of freshmen covered by the ex-
'7 Id. at 1543.
" Id. at 1544.
" Id. at 1544-45. The Christian Student Fellowship is a non-denominational Christian min-
istry that operates a "residential facility for UNK students who wish to share 'a lifestyle which
glorifies Christ.'" Id. at 1545. Rader explained his decision to eschew life in a college dormitory
for that in a Christian facility as follows: "I want to live a daily life which reflects high moral
standards-those standards which my parents and my church have instilled in me. Living in the
residence halls would make that impossible." Id. In short, he believed that the Christian fellow-
ship, prayer, Bible studies, and counseling available in the Christian facility were more condu-
cive to proper living than the sex, drugs, and rock and roll available in the UNK dormitories.
See id. at 1545-46 (citing the availability of condoms and no regulation of visits of members of
the opposite sex in the dormitories, a survey of students attesting to the widespread use of drngs
and alcohol in the dormitories, and describing the general "sinful" atmosphere of the dormito-
ries).
l Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1547. In other words, more than one-third of UNK freshmen were excused from
the housing policy that prohibited Mr. Rader from residing at the Christian facility. Id. at 1551.
" I& at 1548.
" See id. at 1548 n.16 (noting that a 1992-93 manual on residential life published by UNK
states that full occupancy was the goal of the housing policy).
[Vol. 3:3
LONG LIE FREE EYERCISE
emptions. Is there any reason to think that commuters living at
home with their parents are less in need of the social and educational
benefits of dormitory life than are students who ish to live in off-
campus religious communities?"M Are occupancy rates in residence
halls affected when commuters and other exempted subclasses are
allowed to reside off campus? The UNK housing policy is clearly un-
derinclusive as that term was used in Lukui, and the court in Rader
correctly concluded that the "rule cannot be viewed as generally ap-
plicable to all freshman students. " ss The court applied strict scrutiny,
concluded that enforcement of the housing rule against Mr. Rader
was not a narrowly tailored means of serving a compellingly impor-
tant governmental interest, and therefore enjoined the University
from interfering with his free exercise right to reside in the religious
facility.13
Suppose in Rader that the housing policy did not contain categori-
cal exemptions for commuters and other classes of preferred stu-
dents. In other words, suppose UNK adopted an across-the-board on-
campus housing requirement for all freshmen and granted excep-
tions only on an ad Iwc basis at the discretion of University adminis-
trators.3 7 In Rader, the record showed that UNK administrators had
granted ad hoc exceptions for medical need,' for single parents,'" for
a student who wished to provide care for her great-grandmother,"'
for a student who wished to drive his pregnant sister to classes at
UNYa '41 and for a number of students whose petitions were supported
by a member of the UNK Foundation or the state legislature."- How-
ever, when Mr. Rader filed a petition for a religious exception, his pe-
tition was denied."'
'" As one student commentator has observed, "it might be argued that freshmen who ... live
at home ... are in even greater need of the tolerance and diversity promoting effects of dorm
life" than are students, like Mr. Rader, who live with many other students in an off-campus relig-
ious community. Sansom, supra note 25, at 786.
Rader, 924 F. Supp at 1553.
Id at 1558.
Id. at 1544, 1546-47. In fact, UNK did have an ad hoc exemption process in place, pursu-
ant to which University officials granted exceptions from time to time "for various reasons un-
der the rubric of 'significant and truly exceptional circumstances which would nmake living on-
campus impossible.'" Id. at 1546.
'L Id. at 154647. For example, a student "who was depressed and experienced headaches"
was granted an ad hoc exemption. Id at 1547.
'L Id. at 154647. For example, a hardship exception was granted for a student 'who was a
non-custodial parent entitled to visitation with his son on alternating weekends." Id. at 1547.
', Id. at 1547.
11 I
" See i (referring to these VIP exemptions from the housing policy as -administrative ex-
ceptions).
'" Id. at 1548. Douglas Wermedal, the Assistant Director of Residence Life at UNK. ex-
plained that he denied Rader's petition based upon Wermedal's own 'religious expertise:"
which led him to conclude that "there was nothing within the residence halls that would hinder
Rader's practice of religion." Id. Wermedal's superior. UNK Chancellor Glad)s St)les
Johnston, supported the denial of Rader's petition and testified that exceptions should not be
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This ad hoc procedure for individualized exemptions brings even
an otherwise across-the-board campus housing policy squarely within
the Sherbert/Smith rule requiring strict scrutiny when the state refuses
to extend individualized exemptions to cases of religious hardship.""
In Rader, the court concluded correctly that UNK has "created a sys-
tem of 'individualized government assessment' of the students' re-
quests for exemptions, but [has] refused to extend exceptions to
freshmen who wish to live [off campus] for religious reasons."'
Thus, the court continued, "the parietal rule cannot be viewed as
generally applicable to all freshman students." 46
B. The Newark Police Case
Perhaps the most thoughtful judicial analysis of the general appli-
cability requirement can be found in Judge Alito's opinion in the
Newark Police Case, Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark' (hereinafter
"Newark Police'). The Newark, New Jersey Police Department had
adopted a policy prohibiting police officers from wearing beards. Al-
though this proscription was labeled a "Zero Tolerance" policy by the
Chief of Police,48 exemptions were made for medical reasons" and
for "undercover officers whose 'assignments or duties permit a depar-
ture from the requirements. '""5 However, the Department refused to
grant an exemption to two Sunni Muslim officers who were com-
pelled by their religious beliefs to grow beards.' 5'
The Third Circuit held that the Department's decision to allow
exemptions for medical beards but not for religious beards took the
case out of Smith and triggered heightened scrutiny under Lukumi" '
granted in "cases of spiritual hardship" and "that students who do not wish to live in the resi-
dence halls for religious reasons should not attend UNK." Id at 1549.
See supra Part II.B.4.
Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553.
.46 Id.
170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 56 (1999).
Id. at 361.
I d. at 360. The medical exemption was designed primarily to accommodate a skin condi-
tion known as pseudo folliculitis barbae ("PFB"). Id. PFB is an inflammatory infection of the
bearded region popularly known as "razor bumps" or "shaving bumps." This condition primar-
ily afflicts black males and "[r]egular shaving with a sharp blade is usually the precipitating
stimulus." RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAIND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY
684 (1987).
170 F.3d at 360.
. Id. at 360-61. The two officers, Faruq Abdul-Aziz and Shakoor Mustafa, believe that they
are under a religious obligation to grow beards. According to an affidavit of a Sunni Muslim
imam, the refusal of a Sunni Muslim male to grow a beard is a "major sin" as serious a sin "as
eating pork." Id. at 360. Moreover, the sin remains and "the penalties will be meted out by Al-
lah" even if the Sunni Muslim male shaves "because of an instruction of another, even an em-
ployer." Id. at 360-61.
" Id. at 366. Although the court noted that Smith and Lukumi require strict scrutiny when
the general applicability requirement is not satisfied, it assumed, without deciding, that only "an
intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this case arose in the public employment context
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Judge Alito's excellent opinion closely tracked the reasoning of Lu-
kumi regarding underinclusiveness as the key to locating the bound-
ary between general applicability and non-general applicability. The
no-beard policy was underinclusive because beards grown for medical
reasons undermined the Department's interest in uniformity and in
fostering "public confidence" in the police force no less than beards
grown for religious reasons." The court said that "the medical ex-
emption raises concern because it indicates that the Department has
made a value judgment that secular (i.e. medical) motivations for
wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general inter-
est in uniformity but that religious motivations are not.""~ This un-
derinclusiveness was "sufficiently suggestive of discriminatoryintent
so as to trigger heightened scrutiny under Smith and Luiatmi."' The
fact that the exception for medical beards was enacted to address a
perfectly legitimate governmental interest-accommodating the medi-
cal needs of certain police officers-was irrelevant to the court's analy-
sis of the general applicability requirement. Although it is perfectly
proper for the state to accommodate secular hardships, religious
hardships are entitled to equal consideration under Smith and Lu-
kumi
Circuit Judge Alito's opinion in Newark Police demonstrates a so-
phisticated understanding of the general applicability requirement
and the related concept of underinclusiveness. He understands the
subtle but important point that not every exception renders a law
underinclusive (and thus non-generally applicable) under Luihmi. A
law will be deemed underinclusive only when it exempts (or other-
wise leaves unrestricted) secular conduct that endangers or under-
mines the state interests served by the restriction in a similar orgreater de~ree than religious conduct that is subject to the law's re-
strictions.
In Newark Police, Alito understood that the exemption for medical
beards rendered the grooming policy underinclusive, but the exemp-
and since the Department's actions cannot survive even that level of scrntiny.' I. at 366 n.7.
' According to the Neark Police Department, the purpose of its no beard policy was to
.convey the image of a 'monolithic, highly disciplined force." Id. at 366. Uniformity of appear-
ance was designed to bolster "the force's morale and espirit de corps' and to offer the public 'a
sense of security in having readily identifiable and trusted public servants.' Id. Although these
are certainly legitimate state interests, the Department %as unable to explain why the presence
of officers who grow beards for religious reasons threatens these interests more than does the
presence of officers who grow beards for medical reasons. As the court put it: "We are at a los
to understand why religious exemptions threaten important city interests but medical exemp-
tions do not." Id. at 367.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. A law burdening religious exercise is un-
derindusive "only if nonexempted religious conduct is in te sane relationship to the purpose
of a law as exempted secular conduct." Gedicks, supm note 4, at 119. Thus. if the government
can establish that "exempted secular conduct is substantially different in terms of the purpose
of the law than nonexempted religious conduct," the law is not underinclusihe. Id.
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tion for beards worn by undercover police officers did not.'57 He rec-
ognized that beards grown for medical purposes undermine the uni-
form appearance policy in exactly the same way as beards grown for
religious purposes. The exception for beards worn by undercover of-
ficers does not undermine the Department's interest in uniformity,
however, because undercover officers are not held out to the public
as law enforcement personnel.' Thus, the exemption for medical
beards rendered the policy non-generally applicable and triggered
heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. However, a "no
beard" policy that exempted undercover officers and no one else
would satisfy the requirement of general applicability and would be
valid under Smith.'
5 9
C. Some Additional "Test Suites "for Evaluating
the General Applicability Requirement
Some commentators take the position that "courts should not in-
sist, as a constitutional matter, on religious exemptions from laws that
don't discriminate against religion, whether or not the laws contain
secular exceptions."' For example, Eugene Volokh has argued that
"virtually all laws, including those widely seen as aiming at quite seri-
ous harms, contain many secular exceptions."'6 ' Volokh acknowl-
edges that the presence of such secular exemptions, "coupled with
the absence of corresponding religious exemptions," does indeed
demonstrate that the government values the exempted secular con-
duct more highly "than the religious activities (among many other
[unexempted] activities)."' 62 However, he believes this unequal
treatment merely reflects "legislative judgment[s]" about often com-
plex issues of public policy and therefore "may be perfectly proper." 16"
Basically, Volokh believes that courts are poorly equipped to balance
the competing moral claims that often underlie laws creating general
... Fraternal Order of Police 170 F.3d at 365-66.
,' Id. at 366.
I' Id.
'0 Volokh, supra note 125, at 631. Of course, underinclusive laws that exempt certain secular
conduct but not similar religiously motivated conduct do discriminate between the favored
secular activities and the disfavored religious activities. For example, in the Newark Police case,
the Police Department was willing to accept non-uniformity from police officers who grew
beards for medical reasons, but not from officers who grew beards for religious reasons. The
Third Circuit correctly viewed this as a discriminatory value judgment by government officials.
170 F.3d at 365-66. Although the underinclusive scheme of restrictions and exemptions was not
directly targeted at religion, the policy's compassion for medical hardship and indifference to
religious hardship was "sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to trigger height-
ened scrutiny under Smith and Lukumi." Id. at 365.
61 Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model For Religious Exemptions 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1540
(1999).
'' Id. at 1540-41.
' Id. at 1541.
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rules and carving out secular exemptions.'" This is particularly true,
argues Volokh, with respect to laws securing private rights, such as
trespass laws, copyright laws, and contract laws, "even when the laws
contain secular exceptions."'6a
On the contrary, I submit that when the legislature enacts under-
inclusive laws and thereby chooses to accommodate certain "harmful"
secular conduct but not "harmful" religious conduct,' it is the duty
of courts to intervene and protect the free exercise of religion. The
decision of the legislature to value secular conduct that is not ex-
pressly protected by the constitution more than analogous religiously
motivated conduct is precisely the kind of unequal treatment that
should be the minimum standard for constitutional protection of the
free exercise of religion.
I now propose to borrow some of the "test suites" suggested by
Professor Volokh as helpful windows for vieing the meaning of free
exercise in the context of underinclusive laws. Although Volokh ap-
pears to believe that these test suites demonstrate that the underin-
clusion test for general applicability is unworkable, I believe that on
closer examination just the opposite is true. Consider the following
situations:
A person claims an exemption from trespass law to view an apparition of
the Virgin Mary (or other sacred subject) on private land. Assume
trespass law "has exceptions for adverse possession, necessity, [and] law
enforcement."'o
A person claims an exemption to use marijuana as part of a religious rit-
ual in a state that prohibits possession of marijuana but which exempts
the medical use of the drug when prescribed 
by a physician. W?
A person claims a religious exemption from a housing discrimination law
that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but which
exempts owner-occupied dwellings containing 
four apartments or less."'0
Although a complete analysis of these "test suites" is beyond the
scope of this article, I will attempt to sketch the broad outlines of how
these cases should be evaluated under Lukumi and the underinclu-
'"Volokh, supra note 125, at 630-34.
I&. at 632.
The reference in the text to "harmful" secular and religious conduct is based upon tie
Lukumi Court's definition of an underindusive law. See Church of the Lukumi Balalt Aye %.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (noting that a law is underinclusihe. and thus not generally
applicable, when it fils to restrict certain "nonreligious conduct that endangers" the laWs pur-
poses "in a similar or greater degree" than religious conduct subject to the law's restrictions).
Volokh, supra note 125, at 634.
Id. at 632.
'6 Id. at 634.
'o See id. For example, Connecticut prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in the sale or rental of housing, but exempts -a unit in a dweiling containing not more
than four units if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such other unitsas his resi-
dence." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81e (1995).
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sion test. I will also suggest, where appropriate, some "counter test
suites" that might help focus the free exercise issues.
1. The Trespass Test Suite
The first test suite, involving a free exercise claim to trespass on
private property to view a sacred apparition, probably involves a law
that satisfies the requirement of general applicability. The three ex-
ceptions cited by Volokh-adverse possession, necessity, and law en-
forcement-probably do not render the law of trespass non-generally
applicable under Smith and Lukumi, because the degree of underin-
clusion does not appear to be substantial. 7 ' The doctrine of adverse
possession is not an exception to the law of trespass, but rather a"strange and wonderful" means of acquiring title by operation of the
statute of limitations.172 The doctrine of adverse possession does not
permit anyone to trespass on the property of another; it merely rec-
ognizes that once the statute of limitations to recover land from a
wrongful possessor has run, the original owner's right to recover the
land is barred and the adverse possessor thereby acquires "as perfect
title [to the land] as if there had been a conveyance by deed."' The
law enforcement exception, which allows a public official to commit a
trespass when "acting in a lawful manner within the scope of official
authority,"' 74 and the necessity exception, which allows a person to
claim "that a trespass was justified or excused by either public or pri-
vate necessity, ' ' 75 are extraordinary and inconsequential exceptions to
the general primacy of the sanctity of private property.
Thus, underinclusion appears to be a workable test for general
applicability when applied to the law of trespass. However, I will now
propose a counter test suite that I believe demonstrates the woeful
inadequacy of Volokh's proposed free exercise test, a test which al-
lows a law to be riddled with secular exceptions and still qualify as
generally applicable under Smith and Lukumi so long as the law does
not directly target religion for adverse treatment. 16
Assume that a legislature enacts an exception to trespass law allow-
ing persons to enter the private property of another for the purpose
of playing frisbee, touch football or other athletic activities. What
'7' Under Lukumi, an underinclusive law will fail the requirement of general applicability
only when "[tihe underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
"' ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 807 (2d ed. 1993).
' RALPH E. BOYER, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY 49 (4th ed.
1991).
7' 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 204 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). Thus, a police officer
does not commit a trespass when he travels on private property in hot pursuit of a fleeing
criminal suspect.
, Id. at 205. For instance, one may trespass "on the land of another in order to stop the
spread of a fire that threatens one's own land or the surrounding area in general." Id.
,' See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
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does this amended test suite tell us about the relative desirability of
the competing tests for the general applicability requirement?
This additional exception would almost certainly render the law
of trespass substantially underinclusive and thus not generally appli-
cable under my reading of Smith and Lukumi. Since the legislature
has decided to permit a substantial class of secular activities that en-
dangers the right of exclusive possession of private property at least as
much (and probably much more) than religiously motivated tres-
passers, religious defendants should receive strict scrutiny when they
assert free exercise claims against enforcement of the highly selective
trespass law. However, under Volokh's free exercise test, this outra-
geously selective law will be upheld as generally applicable, because it
does not directly target religion for hostile treatment.
If Volokh is correct and this highly selective and discriminatory
law can be enforced against religious conduct ithout even a whim-
per from the Free Exercise Clause, religious liberty is indeed dead as
a constitutional principle. But Volokh is not correct. Under Lukumi,
a highly selective law, such as that described in the amended test
suite, does not satisfy the requirement of general applicability and
almost certainly is unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
This result does not mean that anarchy is lurking around the corner
17 or that the Free Exercise Clause allows one person to interfere ith
the private rights of another person."" It merely means that highly
selective laws are not entitled to the special immunity from the Free
Exercise Clause that Smith bestows upon neutral laws of general ap-
plication. It is certainly true that "I have no right to walk across my
neighbor's land without permission, no matter how vital it may be to
my religion or how minor an imposition it may be on my neighbor."'"
However, in ajurisdiction that allows any Tom, Dick, or Mary to tres-
pass on his or her neighbor's land for certain secular reasons, the
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to provide a compel-
ling justification when it prohibits me from engaging in analogous
conduct for religious reasons. Thankfully, it is unlikely that any state
would be so unwise as to pass a highly selective trespass law such as
the one in our amended test suite.
2. The Marijuana Test Suite
The second test suite, involving a free exercise claim to use the il-
legal drug marijuana as part of a religious ritual, also appears to con-
cern a law that satisfies the requirement of general applicability. Re-
member, the law was an across-the-board prohibition of the
,- See supra notes 29-37 and accompan)ing text.
'' Volokh, supra note 125, at 618.
Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An ronrowm App adh to Issun of Rhgzus
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. RE. 1, 46 (1989).
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possession of marijuana with a single exemption for medical use of
the drug when prescribed by a physician.'8°
Presumably, the purpose for prohibiting marijuana is to protect
citizens against the harmful effects of a dangerous drug.8 The ex-
ception does not render the marijuana law underinclusive with re-
spect to this purpose, because it allows the drug to be used by a pa-
tient only when a doctor has prescribed the drug as medically
beneficial. Thus, the prescription exception "do[es] not trigger
heightened scrutiny [when the law is enforced against religious uses
of marijuana] because the Free Exercise Clause does not require the
government to apply its laws to activities that it does not have an in-
terest in preventing."8 2 In other words, the law satisfies the general
applicability requirement because the state's legitimate interest in
public health is pursued uniformly against all medically harmful uses
of marijuana.
Of course, protecting the health of citizens against a harmful drug
may not be the sole purpose of the marijuana prohibition. The law
may also be intended to protect innocent third parties against the
harmful consequences of the use of marijuana by others, such as risks
resulting from persons driving under the influence of the drug, lost
productivity caused by use of the drug, or other real or perceived183
consequences of marijuana use. But even if the law is found to be
underinclusive for these purposes, it will still satisfy the test of general
applicability so long as the law addresses at least one legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose and is not underinclusive with respect to that
purpose. Thus, the marijuana law in our test suite is generally appli-
cable, even if it is designed to serve multiple purposes, because it is
not underinclusive with respect to at least one such purpose: the
government's legitimate interest in protecting the health of persons
against the unregulated use of a dangerous drug."'
But now allow me to suggest a modification to our test suite that
may deepen our inquiry. Imagine, for example, that the California
legislature prohibits the use of marijuana, but carves out a special in-
terest exception permitting the recreational use of marijuana at rock
' See supra note 169 and accompanying text. See also McBride v. Shawnee County, Kansas
Court Services, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999) (law prohibiting marijuana enforced against
persons who use the drug as part of the religious practice of the Rastafarian faith).
... See Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (1999) (discussing how a state
has an interest in "curbing the unregulated use of dangerous drugs").
'" Id. The underinclusion test requires the purpose for each secular exemption to be com-
pared with the purposes for the law's general rule "in order to determine whether the secular
departure and general rule are consistent." Sansom, supra note 25, at 769.
' I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Eugene Volokh for raising this issue when
commenting on a draft of this article.
'" As I have already shown, the exemption for medical use of the drug when prescribed by a
doctor does not render the law underinclusive for this purpose, because it allows the drug to be
used by a patient only when it is beneficial-and thus, not harmful-to her health as determined
by her physician.
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concerts and alumni receptions at Cal-Berkeley. Surely, this law is
substantially underinclusive'' and its enforcement against religious
users of the drug will trigger strict scrutiny under Lukumi.
As in the previous test suite, the general applicability requirement
is satisfied so long as the state treats religious users of marijuana no
worse than others whose use of the drug similarly threatens the pur-
pose or purposes served by the restriction. Strict scrutiny for relig-
ious claimants is triggered only when the state selectively seeks to fur-
ther its purpose of discouraging use of a harmful drug.
Interestingly, under Professor Volokh's test for religious liberty,
this highly selective law permitting recreational but not sacramental
use of marijuana would be considered generally applicable and thus
perfectly constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause. In my opin-
ion, this demonstrates that Volokh's concept of general applicability
is suspect because it fails to protect religious liberty even against dis-
criminatory laws that substantially burden religious conduct while
permitting far less worthy secular conduct of the same type.
3. The Housing Discrinzination Test Suite
The final test suite, involving a statute that prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing on the basis of sexual orientation and exempts owner-
occupied dwellings with four units or less, concerns a law that ap-
pears to fail the requirement of general applicability. The exception
for owner-occupied duplexes, triplexes, and four-plexes undoubtedly
removes a significant number of rental units from the law's regulatory
restrictions." Thus, the law appears to be substantially underinclu-
sive, because the exception for owner-occupied buildings threatens
the state's purpose in protecting tenants against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation at least as much as discrimination by
religiously motivated landlords.r"
' The law is substantially underinclusive because it allows the recreational use of marijuana
in certain situations that endanger state interests at least as much as religious use of the drug.
Smoking pot at a rock concert or alumni reception is at least as harmfil to health as smoking
the drug as part of a religious ritual. Thus, the exception renders the law non-general) appli-
cable within the meaning of Smith and Ltdumi.
" Depending on the housing markets in any given state, the exemption might %eli remove
thousands or even tens of thousands of rental units from the law's protection against discrini-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation. For example, in his study of homelessne -and hous-
ing policy, William Tucker gathers data demonstrating that a significant percentage of rental
units nationide are in one-, two-, three-, or four-family buildings. Ser WILuxt TtCL2O TilE
EXCLUDED AMERICANS: HOMELESSNESS AND HOUSING POUCIES 194-95 (1990). Many of thewe
buildings are likely to be owner-occupied, because, as Tucker points out. 'becoming a landlord
is often thefirst step in upward mobility for members of the lower-middle-clss ... Affluent pro-
fessional people with good incomes become the owners of single-family houses. People with a
little money buy duplexes, triplexes, and sometimes small apartment houses They become
landlords." Id. at 196.
" Presumably, the purpose of the fair housing law under discussion is to ensure equal access
to housing without regard to sexual orientation. S&e McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729
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For example, suppose this fair housing law is enforced against a
Christian landlady, say Mrs. Murphy, when she refuses to rent a unit
in her (non-owner-occupied) five-plex to a homosexual couple be-
cause she believes it would be sinful for her to facilitate homosexual
conduct. Mrs. Murphy's free exercise claim should be entitled to
strict scrutiny under Lukumi, because the fair housing law is not a law
of general application.
This is so even if we accept that Mrs. Murphy's religiously moti-
vated decision "imposes some real harm on the tenants" who are ex-
cluded from residing on her property.88 Tenants are "harmed" no
more by religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause than by
the analogous secular exemptions approved by the legislature. They
have a "right" to be protected against the "harm" of housing dis-
crimination only because the legislature decided to create such a
"right" when it enacted the fair housing law. As I read the doctrine of
Lukumi, when the legislature enacts underinclusive laws and thereby
chooses to permit certain secular "harms" but not similar religious
"harms," the Free Exercise Clause operates to protect the free exer-
cise of religion. Perhaps the legislature has decided wisely that the
associational interests of certain landlords' 9 outweigh the "right" of
tenants to equal housing opportunities. However, Lukumi requires
that the free exercise claims of religious landlords receive equal ac-
commodation under the law, unless the state has a compelling justifi-
cation for its highly selective fair housing law. Moreover, the under-
inclusiveness of the statute should make it almost impossible for the
state to justify the law, because the allowance of secular exemptions
"is substantial evidence that religious exemptions would not threaten
the statutory scheme."'9
D. Free Exercise As Equal Regard: A Unifying Theory And
A Reasonable Compromise
Smith and Lukumi have transformed the Free Exercise Clause from
a liberty rule, under which religiously motivated conduct was pro-
tected-at least in theory-against any substantial governmental bur-
den, to an equality rule, under which religious practice is entitled to a
kind of most-favored-nation status.'9 ' In other words, an across-the-
(Mich. 1998) (holding that the purpose of law prohibiting marital status discrimination in
housing was to "ensure that no one be denied equal access to housing on the basis of.. .their
marital status.").
'' Volokh, supra note 161, at 1520.
,S9 See id. at 1541 (discussing "freedom of association concerns" and exceptions for "small
companies" from employment discrimination laws).
Laycock, supra note 5, at 50.
'9, Id. at 49. By most-favored-nation status, I mean that religious activities must be treated no
worse than comparable secular activities. "If the state grants exemptions from its law for secular
reasons, then it must grant comparable exemptions for religious reasons" or be prepared to
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board prohibition of some class of behavior may be enforced against
religiously motivated conduct, but when the government pursues un-
derinclusive restrictions against religious practices, the Free Exercise
Clause is triggered and the selective regulatory scheme ill be re-
viewed under a compelling interest test that is strict in theory and
usually fatal in fact.!- This is an equality rule not a liberty rule, be-
cause religious exercise is protected, not as an end in itself, but only
to the extent that analogous secular conduct is protected.
Smith and Lukumi strike a reasonable compromise between the
concerns of those who fear religious liberty as a strain on the social
contract and of those who believe that religious freedom is an essen-
tial component of ordered liberty, between the concerns of those
who fear anarchy and of those who fear religious persecution, be-
tween the concerns of those who believe that free exercise exemp-
tions create an unfair constitutional preference for religion over non-
religion and of those who believe that the absence of free exercise
exemptions in a modern secular state unfairly exposes religious indi-
viduals and subgroups to the powerful forces of assimilation and secu-
larization.9 3 Under Smith and Lukumi the majority may rule without
any fear of religious anarchy, so long as the burdens it creates are not
imposed selectively. However, if the majority decides to impose civic
obligations or restrictions selectively by enacting underinclusive laws,
the Free Exercise Clause requires strict scrutiny when the govern-
ment seeks to enforce these non-generally-applicable burdens against
religiously motivated practices. Rather than creating a constitutional
preference for religion over non-religion, Smith and Lulkmi interpret
the Free Exercise Clause as requiring only that religious conduct be
treated no worse than analogous secular behavior that is exempted or
otherwise sheltered from burdens or restrictions imposed by govern-
ment. ' 4
Lukumi and its emphasis on protecting religious liberty against
underinclusive laws also provides an important de~ree of balance to
Smith's emphasis on majoritarian decisionmaking.' +' It properly rec-
ognizes that the most "serious threat to religious pluralism today is a
pass strict scrutiny. Id at50.
" See supra notes 101-04 and accompan)ing text. Whien a state enacts an underindusive law
granting secular exemptions but not comparable religious exemptions, the secular exemptions
are powerful evidence "that religious exemptions would not threaten the statutory scheme.'
Laycock, supra note 5, at 50. Thus, although it is possible that the state may have a compellingly
important reason for granting secular exemptions but not religious exemptions, 'such cases
should be quite rare." Id.
19 See supra notes 29-45 and accompan)ing text.
The underindusion test also recognizes wisely that when the government exempts influ-
ential secular interests, but refuses to exempt analogous religious interests, it is reasonable to
suspect that this unequal treatment may be "animated by diminished respect and concern for
the religious group whose practice" is selectively burdened. Michaclj. PeNM, Freedoln of Rdhlon
in the United States Fin de Sicle Sketdzes, 75 IND. LJ. 295, 303 (2000).
" See McConnell, supra note 8, at 168.
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combination of indifference to the plight of religious minorities and
a preference for the secular in public affairs."'96 By focusing on un-
derinclusiveness as the test for general applicability, Lukumi defers to
majority rule, but only when the majority treats religious exercise with
equal regard vis-a-vis its treatment of comparable secular activities.
Although some worthwhile free exercise claims will go unprotected
when burdened by laws that are truly neutral and generally applica-
ble, Lukumi strikes a reasonable compromise that will often provide a
high degree of protection for religious liberty and religious plural-
ism.
Lukumi and its underinclusion test can also be understood as
harmonizing free exercise doctrine with the Court's equal protection
analysis concerning legislative classifications that unequally burden
fundamental rights.97 In Lukumi, the Court interpreted the Free Ex-
ercise Clause as requiring the same strict scrutiny standard for under-
inclusive laws burdening religion that the fundamental rights/equal
protection doctrine mandates for "underinclusive government action
that burdens the right to procreation, the right to travel, and other
fundamental constitutional rights."198
Finally, the general applicability requirement also serves as a uni-
fying principle that plausibly explains not only Smith and Lukumi, but
also the two landmark free exercise cases that survived Smith, Sherbert
and Yoder. As I have explained previously, Smith reclassified Sherbert as
a case in which strict scrutiny was properly applied because free exer-
cise was unequally burdened by South Carolina's individualized-and
thus non-generally applicable-unemployment compensation proc-
ess. ' " Interestingly, although Yoder is usually classified as a case in-
volving a neutral and generally applicable law requiring "every child
under sixteen... to attend state-approved schools,"0 in fact the Wis-
consin mandatory school law contained an individualized exception
process covering "any child exempted for good cause by the school
board of the district in which the child resides."2 ' Thus, under Smith
and Sherbert (as Sherbert is now understood), Yoder can be explained as
Id at 169.
' See Gedicks, supra note 4, at 104-19. Professor Gedicks does not read Lukumi this broadly.
Id. at 113-14. Rather, Gedicks argues that religious liberty ought to be treated the same as "pri-
vacy, speech, travel, and other fundamental rights." Id. at 120. I believe Gedicks is correct in
placing a high value on religious liberty, but incorrect in reading Lukumi so narrowly. In my
judgment, Lukumi already requires underinclusive laws restricting religious exercise to be
evaluated under a very toothy compelling interest test. See supra notes 113-59 and accompany-
ing text.
'i Gedicks, supra note 4, at 120
" See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
'o Epps, supra note 37, at 600.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-08 n.2 (1972) (quotingWis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969)).
The lav also contained an exemption for "any child who is not in proper physical or mental
condition to attend school." Id. Under this exception, "[tihe certificate of a reputable physi-
cian in general practice shall be sufficient proof that a child is unable to attend school." Id.
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standing "for the proposition that where the State has in place a sys-
tem of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system
to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Free Exercise Clause has evolved into a leaner, meaner relig-
ious-liberty-protecting machine in the wake of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in Smith and Lukumi Although Smith announced
that government may prohibit what religion requires or require what
religion prohibits so long as it acts through neutral laws of general
application,203 Lukumi emphasized that a "law burdening religious
practice that is not neutral or not of general application must un-
dergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."2 Moreover, Lukumi made clear
that once a law burdening religious exercise fails to meet Smith's re-
quirements of neutrality and general applicability, the free exercise
claim will be protected by a very toothy compelling interest test that
the state will be able to satisfy "only in rare cases."-" Thus, although
some legitimate free exercise claims will be summarily rejected under
Smith when brought against laws that are truly neutral and generally
applicable, many religious liberty claims will receive more protection
than ever under Lukumi when brought against laws that are not neu-
tral or not generally applicable.2"
Under Lukumi, a law that directly targets religion for discrimina-
tory treatment falls "well below" the minimum requirement of gen-
eral applicability0 7 Although Lukumi did not define with precision
the boundary between general applicability and non-general applica-
bility, it did make clear that "categories of selection" and "underin-
clusion" are the earmarks of laws which, although facially neutral with
respect to religion, nonetheless fail to satisfy the general applicability
requirement. In other words, selective laws that fail to pursue legis-
lative ends with equal vigor against both religious practice and analo-
gous secular conduct are not governed by Smith; such underinclusive
laws are subject to surpassingly strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause and Lukumi.
" Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
I at 878-79.
"' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520.546 (1993).
MId.
"If the standard is lack of general applicability, then many statutes violate Smith and Lu-
kumL Federal, state, and local laws are full of exceptions for influential secular interests ....
Where a law has secular exceptions or an indihidualized exemption process. any burden on re-
ligion requires compellingjustification under a reasonable interpretation of Smith and Luhumn."
Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 W'%. & M' L REv. 743, 772
(1998).
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
Id. at 542-43.
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This approach to the Free Exercise Clause appears to be a reason-
able compromise between the concerns of those who fear religious
liberty as a potential source of anarchy and as a serious threat to
democratic self-government, and of those who believe that religious
freedom is an essential component of ordered liberty in a modern,
pluralistic society. Moreover, the Free Exercise Clause that emerges
from Smith and Lukumi does not create an unfair preference for relig-
ion over non-religion. Rather, it requires only that government treat
religious activities with equal regard vis-a-vis its treatment of compa-
rable secular activities. Finally, the general applicability requirement
serves as a unifying principle that explains not only Smith and Lukumi,
but also Sherbert and Yoder.
The reports of the death of free exercise in the wake of Smith were
more than premature, they were seriously mistaken. Under Smith
and (especially) Lukumi, religious liberty will often prevail against
burdens imposed by underinclusive (and thus, non-generally appli-
cable) laws and governmental policies. I think Mark Twain would be
delighted.
